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There are several distinct failure modes for overoptimization of systems on
the basis of metrics. This occurs when a metric which can be used to improve
a system is used to such an extent that further optimization is ineffective or
harmful, and is sometimes termed Goodhart’s Law1. This class of failure is
often poorly understood, partly because terminology for discussing them is am-
biguous, and partly because discussion using this ambiguous terminology ignores
distinctions between different failure modes of this general type.
This paper expands on an earlier discussion by Garrabrant [2], which notes
there are “(at least) four different mechanisms” that relate to Goodhart’s Law.
This paper is intended to explore these mechanisms further, and specify more
clearly how they occur. This discussion should be helpful in better understand-
ing these types of failures in economic regulation, in public policy, in machine
learning, and in artificial intelligence alignment[4]. The importance of Goodhart
effects depends on the amount of power directed towards optimizing the proxy,
and so the increased optimizationpower offered by artificial intelligence makes
it especially critical for that field.
Varieties of Goodhart-like Phenomena
As used in this paper, a Goodhart effect is when optimization causes a col-
lapse of the statistical relationship between a goal which the optimizer intends
and the proxy used for that goal. The four categories of Goodhart effects in-
troduced by Garrabrant are 1) Regressional, where selection for an imperfect
1As a historical note, Goodharts Law [1] as originally formulated states that “any ob-
served statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control
purposes.” This has been interpreted and explained more widely, perhaps to the point where
it is ambiguous what the term means. Other closely related formulations, such as Campbell’s
law (which arguably has scholarly precedence[3]) and the Lucas critique, were also initially
specific, and their interpretation has also been expanded greatly. Lastly, the Cobra Effect and
perverse incentives are often closely related to these failures, and the different effects interact.
Because none of the terms were laid out formally, the categories proposed do not match what
was originally discussed. A separate forthcoming paper intends to address the relationship
between those formulations and the categories more formally explained here.
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proxy necessarily also selects for noise, 2) Extremal, where selection for the met-
ric pushes the state distribution into a region where old relationships no longer
hold, 3) Causal, where an action on the part of the regulator causes the col-
lapse, and 4) Adversarial, where an agent with different goals than the regulator
causes the collapse. These varied forms often occur together, but defining them
individually is useful. In doing so, this paper introduces and explains several
subcategories which differ in important ways.
To formalize the intuitive description, we consider a system S with a set
of possible states s ∈ S. For the initial discussion we focus on a single actor,
the regulator, who influences the system by selecting a permissable region of
the state-space, A ⊆ S. For this discussion, we will use Goal to refer to the
true goal of the regulator, which is a mapping from states G(s)→ R for s ∈ S.
Because regulators have incomplete knowledge, they cannot act based on G(s)
and instead act only on a proxy M(s) → R for s ∈ S2. For simplicity’s sake,
we will consider actions where the regulator chooses some threshold c and the
permissible states are defined such that s ∈ A if M(s) ≥ c. This creates a
selection pressure that allows the first two Goodhart-like effects to occur3.
1 Regressional Goodhart
Regressional Goodhart - When selecting for a proxy measure, you select not
only for the true goal, but also for the difference between the proxy and
the goal. This is also known as “Tails come apart.” [5]
Simple Model:
M = G+ normal(µ, σ2) (1)
Due to the noise, a point with a large M value will likely have a large G value,
but also a large noise value. Thus, when M is large, you can expect G to be
predictably smaller than M. Despite the lack of bias, for large values of c the
values of G when M > c is expected to be higher than otherwise. While this
is the simplest Goodhart effect, it is also the most fundamental: it cannot be
avoided. No matter what measure is chosen for optimization, an inexact metric
necessarily leads to a divergence between the goal and the metric in the tail.
2 Extremal Goodhart
Extremal Goodhart - Worlds in which the proxy takes an extreme value
may be very different from the ordinary worlds in which the relationship
2In general, a mapping from s → R is a measaure, and if used for decision-making, it
is known as a metric. The current presentation assumes a single-dimensional case. Use of
multiple metrics and restrictions follows similar dynamics, but for discussing Goodhart effects
the single dimensional case is ideal.
3This restriction of the available states is one form of selection pressure. There are other
forms of selection pressure which can apply, but these are unnecessary for presenting the
basic dynamics. For example, we often find that the states are chosen probabilistically and
the distribution can be influenced to prefer certain regions. One important such case is
evolutionary selection, where the most likely states are generated based on a set of states
selected in a previous generation.
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between the proxy and the goal was observed. A form of this occurs occurs
in statistics and machine learning as “out of sample prediction.”
Extremal Goodhart can occur in two ways. First, the proxy may have been
simplified based on either an insufficient number of observations to uncover the
true relationship, or because a simpler measure was preferred. In either case,
model insufficiency can lead to extremal Goodhart. Secondly, the measure may
be a correct estimator only in certain regions of the space. In regions where the
generating process differs, the use of the measure leads to extremal Goodhart.
Extremal Goodhart - Model Insufficiency - The metric of interest is based
on a learned relationship between the goal and the metric which is approx-
imately accurate in the initial region. Selection pressure moves the metric
away from the region in which the relationship is most accurate so that
the relationship collapses.
Simple Model:
M = G(si) +G
′(si) (2)
In the case of model insufficiency, the error is induced by model simplification
and inaccuracy, and not a fundamental issue with the inability to build an
sufficiently accurate estimator. In the simplest case, model insufficiency involves
incomplete understanding of an empirically learned relationship. Even though
we assume the relationship is the same within and without the observed range,
it is still often more difficult to detect the exact functional relationship based on
a limited range. More commonly, model insufficiency occurs because complex
systems are approximated using observations of the non-optimized system space.
An example of this phenomenon in public policy is when a relationship is
simplified for use as a measure without recognizing how selection pressure ap-
plied to the metric makes the simplification problematic. In machine learning
this often happens due to underfitting, such as when a relationship is assumed
to be a low degree polynomial because higher order polynomial terms are small
in the observed region. Selection on the basis of the approximated metric moves
towards regions where the higher-order terms are more important, so that use
of the machine learning system creates a Goodhart effect.
Extremal Goodhart - Change in Regime - The proxy M may be related
to G differently in different regions. Even if the correct relationship is
learned for the observed region, in the region where the proxy takes an
extreme value the relationship to the goal may be fundamentally different.
Selection on the basis of the proxy moves into such a region.
Simple Model:
G =
{
M + x, where M <= a
M + y, where M > a
(3)
The case of regime change can be due to measurement error so that errors
are systemically incorrect in a given region. Alternatively, it can be due to
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a generating process that differs in defferent regions. An example of the
first case is where wind-speed measurements may be systematically biased
downwards when the wind-speed exceeds the design tolerances of the in-
struments. In this case, we expect that the relationship between measured
windspeed and wind damage to systematically differ for measured wind-
speeds at and above the maximum tolerance. Any selection pressure for
the second case would cause entremal Goodhart to occur when a boundary
is reached. For example, the relationship between wind speeds and height
undergoes a change above the atmospheric boundary layer. Even when
the correct relationship is learned for this lower altitude, the relationship
changes above it.
In the above cases of regressional and extremal Goodhart, there are issues
with selection pressure for even simple systems when proxies are used. These
two classes require selection pressure, but do not involve an intervention on
the part of the regulator. When a regulator intervenes in the causal sense, it
changes the state-space and allows an additional type of error that depends on
the causal structure of the intervention.
3 Causal Goodhart
Causal Goodhart - When the causal path between the proxy and the goal is
indirect, intervening can change the relationship between the measure and
proxy. If a regulator intervenes to maximize a metric, the causal pathway
can change such that the proxy no longer tracks the goal. In such cases,
extreme interventions can be less effective than more moderate ones, and
further selection or intervention can be counterproductive.
In the earlier cases, the correlational issues found in Goodhart-like effects ex-
ist regardless of causal structure. Here, however, a model that ignores causal
structure is problematic when the regulator’s actions themselves change the re-
lationships. These take the form of Goodhart-like problems, but can be better
discussed in terms of the effect of regulator actions on the causal structure. As a
simple example, a regulator attempting to use a windspeed model to build wind-
mills must be careful not to ignore the effect the windmills themselves have on
wind-speeds. Building many windmills in a given area can alter the wind-speed
in the region enough to invalidate the earlier relationship.
Interestingly, this does not require any uncertainty, nor does it require an
incorrect understanding of the relationships, unlike earlier cases. Instead, the
effect is induced by the regulator’s action. The exact way in which this occurs
can vary, as discussed below.
Three Causal Goodhart Effects
There are a three general cases which lead to causal Goodhart, as well as several
others that may appear similar, but are actually regressional or extremal Good-
hart effects. The below diagram illustrates three classes of causal Goodhart
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effects. In each, the regulator attempts to act based on a correlation between
the measure and the goal by intervening. The node chosen for intervention is
shaded.
X
GoalMetric
Shared Cause
Goal
X
Metric
Intermediary
X
Goal
Goal
Metric
Metric Manipulation
Shared Cause Intervention - The regulator intervenes on a shared cause of
the metric and the goal.
Simple Model: The regulator sets the shared cause X to a maximal value.
The Metric no longer has a causal relationship to the Goal. The relationship
between Metric and Goal now consists entirely of the combination of the error
terms between each and X .
Shared cause intervention may restrict both the Goal and the Metric to a
region favored by the regulator, at the cost of changing the metric’s relationship
to the goal in a way that may be counterproductive for further optimization.
Suppose, for example, that there are two tests administered to students which
are correlated. If a teacher trains skills related to test taking generally, one of the
traits which make the students likely to do well on both tests changes. Because
of this, the remaining relationship between scores on the two tests is due to other
factors, and the new correlation between scores is likely to be lower than the
earlier correlation. This does not imply that the overall outcome is worse than
without the optimization, but more extreme interventions can be less effective
than less extreme ones. For this reason, further selection or intervention on the
basis of the metric can be counterproductive.
Intermediary Intervention - The regulator intervenes on a variable in the
causal chain connecting Goal to Metric.
Simple Model: The regulator sets X to a specific value. The relationship be-
tween the Goal and Metric now no longer exists; they are independent variables.
This does not necessarily affect the Goal at all, but can serve to increase the
value of the metric.
Metric Manipulation - The regulator intervenes to set the Metric, without
affecting other nodes. (In this case, it does not matter how the goal was
related to X, as indicated in the figure.)
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Simple Model: The regulator sets M to a specific value. The relationship
between Metric and Goal now no longer holds.
Imagine, to give another example, that a teacher changes test scores or
grades4. This doesn’t contribute to the goal of learning, it simply changesM so
that it is useless (or, if only some scores are changed, less useful) in measuring
G.
The reason for causal Goodhart effects can either be due to mistaken or
missing understanding of causal effects, or simple lack of foresight. As with
extremal Goodhart effects, mistakes about the causal connection can be due to
insufficient data, or a change in regime. Importantly, the same mistakes can
also lead to extremal or (worsened) correlational Goodhart effects if there is
selection instead of intervention.
Non-Causal Goodhart Effects in Causal Systems
In the below three cases, the figures show where the regulator mistakes the
form of the causal relationship. The dashed lines are the true causal path, and
the dotted lines are the assumed ones. If the regulator attempts to select on
the basis of the assumed model, it can lead to worsened regressional Goodhart
effects or extremal Goodhart effects, but not causal Goodhart effects.
X
GoalMetric
Ignored Shared Cause
Goal
X
Metric
Ignored Intermediary
Ignored Shared Cause - The regulator assumes the relationship between the
Goal and Metric is a causal chain, or is direct, but there is instead a shared
cause. When ignoring X, the metric is valid as a proxy for the goal.
Simple Model:
Metric ∼ normal(X, σ2m)
Goal ∼ normal(X, σ2g)
(4)
However, because of the conditional independence of Goal and Metric, for
any fixed value of X they are uncorrelated. This means that our metric is
less valid if there is selection. With selection of a fixed X, the case resembles
extremal Goodhart, since the regime changed.
4This is assuming the teacher is the regulator - if the teacher is an agent, this is a different
case, explored below.
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Ignored Intermediary - The regulator assumes the relationship between the
Goal and Metric is direct, but an intermediary exists which creates an
additional source of noise.
Without intervention, the causal mistake here adds a term to the error, leading
to the earlier cases of regressional and extremal Goodhart effects.
Goal
Metric
X
Ignored Metric Cause
Goal
Metric
X
Ignored Goal Cause
Ignored Additional Cause - The metric is caused by multiple factors, of
which the goal relates to only some. Alternatively, the goal is caused by
multiple factors, of which the metric relates to only some. (No Figure
provided.)
Simple Model:
Metric ∼ normal(X +Goal, σ2m) (5)
or
Goal ∼ normal(X +Metric, σ2g) (6)
If X has a distribution that matches the distribution of error of the assumed re-
lationship between X and the metric, this leads to worsened regressional Good-
hart effects as defined above, because additional noise is due to X . In this
simple model case the goal is caused by the metric, for example height causing
windspeed. More commonly, the metric would be caused by some Y , which also
causes the Goal. In such a case, the metric might be measured height, where
the measurement itself can have error. On the other hand, if X is distributed
differently than the assumed distribution of error in the relationship between
Goal and Metric, there is a model insufficiency issue. If X contains some nonlin-
earity, it is a regime change. The earlier examples of extremal Goodhart effects
are of these types. (More complex errors can lead to similar mistakes.)
4 Adversarial Goodhart
The discussion of causal relationships is important for a different class of sit-
uations where there are multiple actors. There are numerous such dynamics,
but they can be classified as happening in one of two cases. First, the actor
may have goals which the regulator is unaware of (or insufficiently wary about)
and the agent can act independently of the regulator in a way that adversely
affects the regulator’s goal. We refer to such cases as adversarial misalignment.
Second, the regulator can use incentives to align the agent’s goals and use their
actions as a way to optimize, while not acting themself. We refer to these as
7
“Cobra effects.” In all of these cases, which were called “adversarial Goodhart”
in the previous work, other agents react in different ways to create Goodhart-
like effects following any of the earlier paradigms. We introduce and formulate
several specific cases of each.
Adversarial Misalignment Goodhart - The agent applies selection pres-
sure knowing the regulator will apply different selection pressure on the
basis of the metric5.
The adversarial misalignment failure can occur due to the agent creating ex-
tremal Goodhart effects, or by exacerbating always-present regressional Good-
hart, or due to causal intervention by the agent which changes the effect of the
regulator optimization.
Campbell’s Law - Agents select a metric knowing the choice of regulator met-
ric. Agents can correlate their metric with the regulator’s metric, and
select on their metric6. This further reduces the usefulness of selection
using the metric for acheiving the original goal.
Simple Model: GR, MR are the regulator’s goal and metric. GA, MA are the
agent’s goal and metric. (The agent selectsMA after seeing the regulator choice
of metric.)
MR = GR +X
MA = GA ·X
(7)
Here, the agent selects for values with high MA, and the regulator’s later se-
lection then creates a relationship between X and their goal, especially at the
extremes. The agent does this by selecting for a metric such that even weak
selection on MA hijacks the regulator’s selection on MR to acheive their goal.
The agent choice of metric need not be a useful proxy for their goal absent the
regulator’s action. In the example given, if X ∼ normal(µ, σ2), the correlation
between GA and MA is zero over the full set of states, but becomes positive on
the subspace selected by the regulator.
There are clearly further dynamics worth exploring, but this case serves
to introduce the issues involved in adversarial conflict over metrics without
incentives. When the regulator attempts to regulate via incentives, a new set
of cases can occur, which are generally related to what is know as the “Cobra
Effect.” [7] This is named after a supposed situation in colonial India where
British authorities offered a reward for dead cobras. Instead of hunting cobras,
5This is the case most closely related to Campbell’s law[6], which was originally stated
as “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt
the social processes it is intended to monitor.” In this case, the choice of measurement affects
the outcome because agents attempt to corrupt the measure.
6They could instead alter causal structure to create the same effect. It seems unclear that
this difference is critical to the dynamics considered.
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however, some people bred and killed their own cobras to kill in order to receive
rewards. This not only failed to achieve the goal, but led to more cobras than
before the reward was offered. Because of the (supposedly) historical meaning
and popular usage, we differentiate between cobra effects that fit this model,
which we will call normal cobra effects, and ones where the agent applies pressure
in a non-causal fashion to create Goodhart effects, which we call non-causal
cobra effects.
Normal Cobra Effect - The regulator modifies the agent goal, usually via an
incentive, to correlate it with the regulator metric. The agent then acts by
changing the observed causal structure due to incompletely aligned goals
in a way that creates a Goodhart effect.
Simple Model: The agent finds cause Y (an “Ignored Additional Cause”)
which is unobserved or constant in the structure the regulator initially consid-
ered, and the agent changes the value of Y in order to maximize the metric.
(This is a form of causal Goodhart using metric manipulation.)
Goal
Metric
Y
Cobra Effect
GAR = GA0 +MR (8)
The Cobra effect can also occur via an agent action that creates any of the
above-mentioned causal Goodhart effects, namely shared cause, intermediary,
or metric manipulation.
Non-Causal Cobra Effect - The regulator modifies the agent goal to make
agent actions aligned with the regulator’s metric. Under selection pressure
from the agent, extremal Goodhart effects occur or regressional Goodhart
effects are worsened.
Simple Model: GR, MR are the regulator’s goal and metric. GA0 and GAR
are the agent’s goal before and after regulator modification.
GAR = GA0 +MR (9)
When the agent applies selection pressure, it creates a Goodhart effect on the
regulator metric.
Conclusion
This paper represents an attempt to categorize a class of the simple statistical
misalignments that occur both in any algorithmic system used for optimization,
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and in many human systems that rely on metrics for optimization. The dy-
namics highlighted are hopefully useful to explain many situations of interest in
policy design, in machine learning, and in specific questions about AI alignment.
In policy, these dynamics are commonly encountered but too-rarely discussed
clearly. In machine learning, these errors include extremal Goodhart effects due
to using limited data and choosing overly parsimonious models, errors that oc-
cur due to myopic consideration of goals, and mistakes that occur when ignoring
causality in a system. Finally, in AI alignment, these issues are fundamental to
both aligning systems towards a goal, and assuring that the system’s metrics
do not have perverse effects once the system begins optimizing for them.
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